The Charity Commission in Mumbai takes a 2% fee on all donations to Mumbai groups. The fee is supposed to cover the cost of the Commission, but seeing as it isn’t staffed with qualified people, there isn’t a computer in their offices, and it generally does nothing, I think this is my new least favorite thing about Mumbai’s government. They have many millions (if not billons) of rupees collected that are just sitting there. They should, at the least, return some of this money.
Thankfully, the NGOs have gotten together and made serious efforts to get rid of this fee, and it should be gone soon. A good site for more information on this issue (and NGOs generally) is karmayog.com.
Usually when we meet with groups there is a mix of operational/strategic personnel and fundraising staff. On occasion, however, we have met with groups that are largely composed of fundraisers. And when half or more of the people we first meet are from the NGO’s fundraising staff it usually turns out that they never fully grasp that the Initiative is not a fundraising effort and rather is something to help them to refine their thinking, refine their efforts towards outcomes and aims, and that the fundraising aspect is a side part, largely to encourage donor engagement. It will be interesting to see if these organizations are engaged enough to make our efforts valuable to them and whether they will put in the significant effort that is necessary.
Most of the annual reports of the organizations we have looked at offer very little material that is not available on the website. The information on the website is usually easier to access is more current. The annual report's only real benefit seems to be to consolidate information in one place and provide easier access to financials. However, for the better performing groups, the website provides all the same information, if not more, so the only advantage seems to be the financial information. But because financial disclosures are limited to the statutory minimum, they provide little depth as to actual expenditures, whether expenses were double counted, etc. problems we have already found. As such, I am bound to think that they are a total waste of time, more meant as marketing material without much meet. They are useful to get some information or a quick idea of what the organization does or wants to do, but one is better off going to the website. That is not to say that they are all bad.
A few prospective donors have said that they would like to see annual reports to make funding decisions. I think this is mostly from corporate practice and not because anyone actually finds a great deal of value in them.
Alex and I attended a conference with high level officials from Mumbai and London, including London Mayor Ken Livingston. We concluded that Mumbai leadership has an unrealistic view about what is happening here and has satisfied themselves by hiring advisers to support their belief that as long as Mumbai keeps on its current path, it will be the greatest city in the world.
There seems to be no plan on how to tackle the problems that are apparent to everyone. In fact, I don’t think they recognize half the problems that there are. And a lot of this, I think comes from a lack of thinking about what they want to ultimately achieve. This is in strong contrast to what the
I read an article by Alex Hatton (“Guilt by Association,” Charity Times, Jan-Feb 2007. http://www.charitytimes.com/pages/ct_features/jan-feb07/text_features/ct_janfeb07_supfeature3_guilt_by_association.htm.) It is an interesting discussion of how its is significantly more expensive to secure new donors than existing donors and that guilt-based appeals discourage new donors. New donors require more information about how their money is being used and how it is making an impact. They also appreciate open discussions on aims and accomplishments and a focus on hope and progress instead of despair.
I’ve read a couple recent articles from Mohammed Yunnis, in which he is calling on the development of social stock exchanges. He supports both the creation of platforms for companies that are spending resources on charitable pursuits, as well as listing civil society organizations that do “good.”
Thankfully, people have created many such social investment exchanges. In addition to GiveIndia, there are several online social investment exchanges. These groups do a phenomenal job and work longer hours than many bankers and lawyers I know to help civil society organizations. So if you are inclined to give, these are all reliable.
1. Bring Light www.bringlight.com
2. CanadaHelps: www.canadahelps.org
3. Changing the Present : www.changingthepresent.org
4. Charity Aid Foundation: www.cafonline.org
5. Conexion Colombia: www.conexioncolombia.com
6. DonorEdge www.donoredge.org
7. DonorsChoose: www.donorschoose.org
8. Give2Asia: www.give2asia.org
9. Give
10. GlobalGiving: www.globalgiving.com
11. Greater Good
12. Help
13. Just Give: www.justgive.org
14. Just Giving: www.justgiving.com
15. Kiva: www.kiva.org
16. Microplace: www.microplace.com
17. Modest Needs: www.modestneeds.com
18. Network for Good: www.networkforgood.org
19. Social Investment Exchange: www.sasix.co.za
It turns out that of the 425 MPs, 360 of them list social work as their primary occupation – just giving credence to the belief that many Indian NGOs are just channels to funnel political money or launder graft.
Of course, this is not true for most NGOs, but it is a concern that requires some diligence and gives support to the Credibility Alliance/GiveIndia idea that political affiliation needs to be examined thoroughly.
On one hand you have a completely different model in
Also, in a country where the government would not otherwise get involved and does not develop some sort of expertise, it is probably better to turn to private organizations.
But in
After doing a few more workshops, I think that my initial position on the strategy vs. prerequisites distinction was wrong. It is important to make a distinction between the two because strategies will change. They may not be successful in bringing about the necessary outcome or may have to be changed for various other reasons (e.g., resources, time, change in law). So, if a group lists a strategy instead of a prerequisite, then the map of the theory of change risks having to be changed more frequently than necessary. While the map is supposed to be a “living” document and should change, it should strive to remain as consistent as possible so that all stakeholders understand the larger picture.
What I am finding is that the best NGO leaders do tend to have some private/business experience before entering civil society. The difference between the good NGO leaders and the mediocre/bad ones, is that the good ones are extremely good. They were not just skilled bankers, financiers, etc., they were likely near the top of whatever organization they were at before. This makes sense – running an NGO is much harder than most private business. Not only does the NGO head have to be the organizations visionary and force it to stay consistent to its goals, he or she is often called on to give advice in everyday problems. As a result, he or she needs to manage macro and micro problems. He or she needs to be a macro-level manager, while providing micro-level input. And if the NGO is really successful, he or she will likely be called on by other NGOs to help solve their problems – which, given how much all of the NGOs need each other to tackle larger issues, means he or she can’t say no to any requests for help. If this wasn’t enough, often that NGO leader will be the only one in his or her organization that is even remotely capable to taking on this much responsibility. So, my point is that just because a person is a successful student or businessperson, does not mean he or she will be a successful NGO manager…to be one you probably need to have been an exceptional student and a phenomenal businessperson.
I’ve had several discussions with people writing articles on “new philanthropy’s” focus on bringing market ideas to NGOs and civil society in general. While I agree with many of those ideas – like transparency, disclosure of risks and key information, public reports – I am wary that emphasizing market concepts can thwart younger groups from going through the “inefficient” nascent stages of their development.
It is particularly important that people start voicing these types of concerns in
I’ve heard some anecdotal evidence to support this but will track it during the donor-engagement stages to see if it is true – especially for Indian donors.
The overall theme of our portfolio seems to slowly be coming together – education and care for those children that fall outside
In our group of NGOs, we have several education and care charities for children who are not able to participate in the elite or better Indian private school. So we have groups trying to reform the public school, creating private schools for slum children, schooling and training disabled children, working with street children, providing care for the orphaned and abused. There are some more that fall outside this group but for the pilot this seems to be the unifying theme.
We have met with a couple of NGOs that have already gone through their own audits before meeting with us. As would be expected some are more useful than others. Most audits are hybrids, but roughly, there seem to be three general types of audits in
The first – and most common -- type of audit is a “Financial Audit”. It aims to see that resources are properly accounted for and are used accurately. If the NGO has a limited number of accounts, these generally tend to be good. But if the NGO has multiple accounts and multiple ledgers – as many tend to have – the audits are too superficial to be meaningful. There needs to be a more thorough effort in many of these audits to compare expenditures and revenues across the accounts to ensure that there are not abuses (such as debiting one expense several times or paying salaries multiple times).
The second type is an “Organizational Review” – it tends to summarize what the NGO does and then tries to categories that information into categories so that the NGO can best see how to proceed, use resources, and what activities to more actively pursue. The primary use of this model is that it helps give context to a complicated organization’s operations. It does little, however, to help the NGO reflect on why it is doing something or how it fits into its overall objectives.
The third type is the “Strategic Review.” This audit tries to capture a mission statement and then look at what the group does and project a three or five year plan. While some effort is made at trying to identify the overall outcome the NGO wishes to achieve, it is not usually captured in terms of what is generally achievable. It is often too lofty. As a result, the three and five year plans sound great but are more often over ambitious proclamations than real strategies. They also tend to focus on scaling up without true thought on whether this it is in the organization’s best interest (or if it is, then if scaling up is done in an appropriate time frame or scope) and on increasing fundraising. In fact, almost every one of these “Strategic Reviews” has a sizeable section on increased fundraising.
What I think is the benefit of our process is that it offers very little in terms of advice on what changes need to be made or how to make necessary changes. Instead, it works as an organizational tool by helping NGOs see exactly what they want to achieve and what they will have to do to reach that (practically achievable) result.
This is supplemented by the reporting template Alex and I are developing. The report forces NGOs to identify their main activities, how successful these activities are and the evidence for these results, their overall strategy are following. This helps the NGO see what activities might not fit into their overall goals and where to focus resources. Further, by making sure that the NGOs clarify the overall environment and context in which they are operating, they are forced to make sure there activities are practical. Additionally, we require NGOs to explain and examine their finances more clearly. This works in combination with the organizational reporting sections to make NGOs consider whether they are using resources adequately. Once the report is completed, the NGO not only has a roadmap of how to achieve results it wishes to achieve, but also can see whether its current activities are helping it to reach those results. While we function as a sounding board, we leave the ultimate decision on how to make necessary changes in practices or strategy to the NGO (which best understands how to solve the problem). By doing so, we also avoid some of the really ridiculous solutions we have seen proposed by some outside auditors.
